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ABSTRACT 
In 2016, the Japanese Supreme Court apologized for establishing a 
special tribunal for leprosy patients outside a standard courtroom. The 
Supreme Court initially admitted that the special tribunal was 
unconstitutional because the unfair procedure and trials discriminated 
against leprosy patients. The Supreme Court’s decision to establish 
exceptional courts at the time was not based on scientific research 
regarding leprosy. These patients were isolated in sanatoriums until 
1996, when Parliament abolished the Leprosy Prevention Law. Then, 
in 2001, the Kumamoto district court accepted governmental 
responsibility for the legislative inaction that led to the government’s 
compulsory isolation policy. The Kumamoto court noted that the 
statute of limitations started in 2001, when the legislature abolished 
the Leprosy Prevention Law. 
The Office of the Supreme Court is the public office responsible for 
managing the court’s human resources and facilities, and for rationally 
and efficiently operating the judicial system in order to exercise 
judicial power. The duties of the office include: internal control, 
administration of personnel, budget negotiation, and design of the 
judicial system. 
Since the Japanese Constitution was established, some have argued 
that the Supreme Court’s power of administration was too enhanced in 
terms of the individual judges’ independence, as, in some cases, this 
independence emerged in the Court’s decisions. The Japanese 
Supreme Court’s official apology is a big step toward judicial integrity. 
This Article reviews the constitutionality of judicial administration in 
the leprosy case from the perspective that the legitimacy and validity 
of the judiciary depends on fairness and justice. 
I 
THE LEPROSY CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
In 2016, the Japanese Supreme Court admitted moral responsibility 
and apologized for the government’s prior treatment of leprosy 
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patients.1 The Court released a report detailing how its treatment of 
leprosy patients promoted discrimination and infringed on human 
dignity.2 
In Japan, since before World War II (WWII) and up until 1996, the 
government applied a policy of isolation to leprosy patients.3 In 1907, 
the Meiji government passed a statute4 related to leprosy, which led to 
the forced imprisonment of homeless lepers in the sanatorium.5 The 
homeless lepers suffered serious discrimination and, to avoid 
imprisonment, they constantly relocated. 6  In 1929, each prefecture 
started a campaign called the “No Leprosy Prefecture Campaign” to 
find and isolate these patients.7 Then in 1936, leprosy patients were 
forced into a national sanatorium by law.8 
Around 11,000 patients were detained in a national sanatorium 
between 1936 and 1996.9 They were not permitted to marry, have 
children, or to hold employment outside the sanatorium.10 In essence, 
leprosy patients faced significant bias and prejudice—prejudice that 
was projected onto their relatives such that the families of leprosy 
patients tried to erase the existence of those patients from their family 
history in order to escape discrimination themselves. 
After WWII, even though an effective medical treatment for leprosy 
had been developed and research determined that the infectious 
capacity of leprosy was weak, the government maintained its isolation 
 
1 HANSEN BYOU TO RIYU TO SURU KAITEI BASHO SITEI NI KANSURU CHOUSA 
HOUKOKUCHO [THE INVESTIGATION REPORT REGARDING VENUE OF THE COURT ON THE 
GROUND OF LEPROSY], 1, (Apr. 2016), http://www.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/2804chousahouko 
kusho.pdf (last visited May 29, 2017), [hereinafter HANSEN REPORT]. 
2 Id. at 1–7. 
3 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
4 Rai yobou ni kansuru ken [Instituting the Leprosy Prevention Law], Law No. 10 of 
1907 (Japan). 
5 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Rai yobou hou [Leprosy Prevention Law], Law No. 11 of 1907 (Japan). 
9 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
10 Id. 
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policy.11 Following the Kumamoto district court’s decision in 2001,12 
the office of the Supreme Court began researching how lepers were 
treated between 1948 and 1972.13 The resulting report revealed that the 
Court established a special tribunal to hear cases for leprosy patients in 
an isolated sanatorium starting in 1948.14  Judges were sent to this 
special tribunal even though Article 7615 of the Japanese Constitution 
strictly prohibits the establishment of special tribunals, only allowing 
an exception for cases involving parties suffering from an infectious 
disease.16 The Supreme Court approved ninety-five out of ninety-six 
applications from 1948 to 1972 for this exceptional tribunal––which 
was a remarkable feat, as only nine out of sixty-one applications 
involving tuberculosis patients were approved.17 
The Supreme Court’s report concluded that the procedure to 
establish this tribunal was illegal, that the discrimination against lepers 
was suspicious, and that the Court’s establishment of a special tribunal 
reinforced the bias and prejudice against the lepers.18 The report further 
noted that by 1960, leprosy had been eradicated. 19  Following the 
report’s release, the Secretary General of the office of the Supreme 
Court publicly apologized on behalf of the Court.20 
This Article reviews the Court’s apology and the independence of 
judges through the lens of Japanese constitutional law. One of the most 
notable aspects of the report is that although the apology was genuine, 
it came too late to help the victims. In fact, by the time the office of the 
Supreme Court issued the apology in 2016, twenty years passed since 
the isolation policy was abolished, and fifteen years passed since the 
2001 Kumamoto court decision.21 It was not until 2013, when a leper 
victim group requested review, that the Court began its investigation, 
 
11 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
12 Id. 
13 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. 
14 Id. at 4–31. 
15 Id.; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 76., para. 2 (Japan). 
16 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 7–10. 
17 Id. at 4, 8. 
18 Id. at 42–56. 
19 Id. 32–38. 
20 Saikosai Choukan Fukaku Owabi [President of Supreme Court Apology], YOMIURI 
SHIMBUN (May 3, 2016), https://mainichi.jp/articles/201604225/k00/00e/040/213000c 
?mode=print. 
21 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 39–42. 
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even though a 2005 study council report from the Japanese Bar 
Association already concluded that the special tribunal was illegal.22 
A second notable aspect of the report is that the report was 
unsatisfactory. The report did not explain why the Court delayed its 
review, did not provide a complete analysis with respect to suspicion, 
and did not conclude that the tribunal was unconstitutional. The Court 
created an expert committee composed of scholars and lawyers who 
surmised that the special tribunal for leprosy patients was 
unconstitutional for two reasons: first, the tribunal violated the equal 
treatment clause provided under Article 1423 of the Constitution; and, 
second, the closed trial procedure for this tribunal violated the open 
trial clause under Article 82.24 
Although the Supreme Court heard the expert committee’s analysis 
and noted the committee’s opinion in its report, it refrained from 
concluding that the tribunal was unconstitutional and instead argued 
that, at the time of the decision, there were no materials or information 
available to approach the issue differently.25 
A third notable aspect of the report is that victim remedies were only 
quickly provided by the legislature, not by the judiciary itself.26 In 
2001, the Diet passed a special compensation statute for leprosy 
patients, however the patients complained that the Supreme Court did 
not find its policy unconstitutional. 27  As the guardian of the 
Constitution under Article 98, the Court should have protected those 
minorities who could not voice their own concerns in Parliament.28 
This is because the political process theory for judicial review was 
imported into Japanese constitutional law studies29  such that when 
 
22 Hansen byou mondai ni kansuru kenshou kaigi [Verification Committee Concerning 
Hansen’s Disease Problem], JAPANESE L. FOUND., https://www.jlf.or.jp 
/work/hansen_report.shtml#saisyu (last visited May 29, 2017). 
23 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (Japan). 
24 Id. at art. 82. 
25 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 1, 5, 8, 17, & 30. 
26 Hansen byou ryouyoujo tou ni taisuru hoshoukin no sikyuni kansuru houritsu [Act on 
Payment of Compensation for Hansen’s Disease Recreation Area Residents,], Law No. 63 
of 2001 (Japan). 
27 KOJI SATO, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 628 (2011). 
28 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 2 (Japan). 
29 SHIGENORI MATSUI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 49 (Yuhikaku 2007). Matsui 
argues that the Constitution of Japan is a document of political process between the 
government and people. Id. 
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minorities cannot represent themselves in Parliament (the Diet), the 
judiciary is obligated to be their representative.30 
A fourth notable aspect of the report is that the report did not address 
the fact that the patients’ isolation in the national sanatorium was 
discriminatorily suspicious and infringed on the right to movement 
under the Constitution.31 The Kumamoto district court explained that 
the right to movement is based on personal rights in Article 13 and 
economic rights in Article 22 of the Constitution.32 Some lawyers who 
attended the leprosy tribunals wrote that the patients wanted to leave 
the sanatorium immediately after entering, noting that the patients were 
not treated with dignity. 33  The Court’s report analyzed only the 
procedure for creating the tribunal, but not the motivation behind the 
formation of this special tribunal. 34  The purpose of judicial 
independence under Article 76 35  is that neutral judges can hear 
complaints between parties and announce what the law is on the 
matter.36 The special tribunal for leprosy patients calls into question the 
independence of the judiciary, as will be reviewed in Part III of this 
Article. 
In 2016, the families of leprosy patients brought an action to the 
Kumamoto district court for damages under the State Redress Act 
(Redress Act).37 The fifty-nine complaints asked for 5,000,000 yen per 
victim.38 Legislation was passed with respect to the patients, but no 
compensation was provided to their families. Under Article 17 of the 
Constitution, the government is liable for the illegal exercise of 
governmental power by governmental officers.39 
 
30  KOJI SATO, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 628 (2011). 
31 For an analysis on the right to move, see TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, ET AL., KENPŌ I 
[CONSTITUTION I] 459, 462 (Yuhikaku 2012), [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL. I]. 
32 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 13 (Japan). 
33 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. 
34 Id. at 42–59. 
35 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 3 (Japan). 
36 TOSHIHIKO NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II] 225–44 (Yuhikaku 2012), 
[hereinafter NONAKA ET AL. II]; SATO, supra note 27, at 575. 
37 Kokka Baishou Hō [The State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1 (Japan). 
38 Hansen byou, kazoku ga teiso, shuudan de kokka baishou seikyu, kumamoto chisai 
[Hansen Disease, Patient Families Brought Action Against Government Under State 
Redress Act], MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Feb. 15, 2016), https://mainichi.jp/articles/20160216 
/k00 /00m /040/082000c. 
39 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 17 (Japan). 
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A. The 2001 Kumamoto District Court 
Before delving further into the analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
report, it is necessary to review the 2001 Kumamoto district court 
decision. In this case, the court found the Minister of Welfare liable 
under the Redress Act, stating that after 1965, it was no longer 
necessary to maintain the isolation policy, and therefore, Parliament 
should have passed relevant measures.40 Thus, under the Redress Act, 
Parliament’s inaction since 1965 warranted damages; however, the 
statute of limitation on the claim began running in April 1996, when 
the leprosy legislation was abolished.41 
Article 41 of the Constitution provides that law-making power 
belongs solely to the Diet and that such power includes when and how 
statutes are passed.42 Both the action and inaction of the Diet falls under 
the Redress Act and judicial review; however, it is difficult to assert 
damages against the Diet, especially for neglecting to enact a specific 
bill, because the legislature is supposed to represent its constituents.43 
Thus, because the Diet has this direct voter connection through 
elections, the Diet has wide discretion over when and how statutes are 
enacted. 44  Voters judge the Diet’s actions and inactions through 
elections; thus, judging the Diet’s record does not typically fall under 
the purview of judicial review.45 Under concrete judicial review in 
Japan, it is difficult to bring litigation to declare or confirm that a 
legislative action is unconstitutional.46 However, it is possible for a 
plaintiff to assert a claim for damages under the Redress Act.47 The 
Japanese judiciary has no power to obligate the Diet to pass, amend, or 
abolish bills or exercise alternative powers. In 1985 however, the Court 
held there was a specific condition under which the government could 
be held responsible under the Redress Act, and such extraordinary 
circumstances must involve the Diet’s failure to pass a bill it was 
 
40 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
41 Id. 
42 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 9, 75, & 82; SATO, supra note 27, at 356–59. 
43 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 9, 39, & 75–82. 
44 Id. at 282–85. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 283–85; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], arts. 76 & 81 (Japan). 
47 Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo tsu) nos. 82, 83, (Gyo Hi) 
nos. 76, 77, 59(7) SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087 (Japan). In this 
case, the Supreme Court held the government liable under the State Redress Act for inaction 
to amend the Public Official Election Act prohibiting voters from living outside Japan. Id. 
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clearly obligated to pass.48 Under this condition, the Diet is required to 
take legal responsibility for the lack of legislative action taken by 
individual members of the Diet.49 
Similarly, the 2001 Kumamoto court decision recognized damages 
caused by the government’s leprosy isolation policy since 1960 and the 
inaction of the Diet since 1965. 50  The government under Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi did not appeal the Kumamoto district court 
decision.51 Prime Minister Koizumi apologized and the Japanese Bar 
Association praised this apology. 52  It is not common for citizen 
plaintiffs to win a case against the government under the State Redress 
Act.53 Such an outcome was due to the fact that when litigation is 
commenced against the government under the State Redress Act, 
judges sent to the Ministry of Justice generally represent the 
government.54 Judges are regularly sent for training to the Ministry of 
Justice for a certain period before returning to the judiciary.55 Often, 
judges who previously represented the government in the Ministry of 
Justice also hear the case in which the government is sued under the 
Redress Act.56 Thus, under the Redress Act, it is difficult to win a case 
seeking damages. 
B. The Meiji Constitution to the Current Constitution 
Under the Meiji Constitution, the Supreme Court (Dai Shin In) was 
established and the special tribunal and administrative court was 
 
48 Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 21, 1985, Showa 50(0) no. 1240, 39(7) SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1512 (Japan). The 1985 Supreme Court case 
involved a person who was injured while shoveling snow off his roof. Following his injury, 
the individual could not leave his home to vote, and the Public Official Election Act had 
abolished home voting (At the time it was abolished, home voting was abused.). Id. 
49 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 283–84; SATO, supra note 27, at 636–41. 
50 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
51 Hansen byou mondai no souki katsu zenmenteki kaiketsu ni muketeno naikaku 
souridaijin danwa [Statement by Prime Minister for Rapid and Comprehensive Remedy for 
Hansen Disease] (May 25, 2001), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/kenkou/hansen 
/hourei/4.html. 
52 Id. 
53 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 283–84; SATO, supra note 27, at 636–41. 
54 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 247; Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control 
of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 269 (Philip 
S.C. Lewis ed., 1994). 
55 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 269–70. 
56 Id. at 271. 
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developed.57 The Minster of Justice exercised its power of appointment 
to create the Supreme Court.58 The Minister of Justice swayed judges 
who worked for administrative affairs in the Ministry by promoting 
those within the Ministry of Justice who rendered decisions in favor of 
the government. 59  Thus, those who wanted promotions within the 
Ministry of Justice rendered decisions in favor of the government.60 
The administrative court was established in Tokyo, and its decisions 
were final—no appeals were permitted to the general judiciary.61 As 
the Kojima case demonstrates in the next Part, although judicial 
independence was established, the independence of individual judges 
was comparatively weak under the strong Ministry of Justice.62 
After WWII, the previous Supreme Court was abolished and a new 
Supreme Court began functioning under the current Constitution.63 
Under the current Constitution, the Supreme Court and inferior courts 
(high, district family, and summary courts) were established under 
Article 76.64 The President of the Supreme Court is appointed by the 
Emperor after the cabinet makes such a designation under Article 6.65 
Other Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the cabinet from 
a list of people nominated by the Supreme Court and the Emperor 
subsequently affirms the nominations.66 Judges in inferior courts are 
appointed by the cabinet based on a list of judicial candidates prepared 
by the Supreme Court under Article 80 of the Constitution.67 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Japanese Constitution prohibits 
special tribunals under Article 76(2). 68  This prohibition contains 
exceptions for hearing complaints of a specific status as well as certain 
 
57 DAINIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [Meiji Constitution, Constitution of the 
Empire of Japan], at art. 57 (Japan). 
58 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 240; SATO, supra note 27, at 62. 
59 IZUMI TOKUJI, WATASHI NO SAIKOUSAIBANSHO RON [MY PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
SUPREME COURT], 12–13 (2013). 
60 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 271. 
61 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 235–36; SATO, supra note 27, at 62. 
62 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 235–36; SATO, supra note 27, at 62. 
63 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76 (Japan). 
64 Id.; Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 2 (Japan). 
65 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6 (Japan). 
66 Id. at art. 80. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at art. 76, para. 2. 
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cases within the independent jurisdiction of the general judiciary.69 The 
family court and intellectual property court within the high court are 
not regarded as prohibited special tribunals because these tribunals hear 
specific kinds of cases, are organized under the hierarchy of the general 
system of the judiciary, and an appeal to the general judiciary court is 
available.70 These specialized courts are presided over by judges who 
acquired special training and knowledge that enables them to develop 
flexible solutions to cases presented to them. 71  Some believe that 
judges in these courts offer speedier decisions and better remedies than 
tenured judges in general courts. Cases in these courts may be reviewed 
by administrative agencies in preliminary trials and appeals to the 
general judiciary are available.72 
II 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Judicial independence is crucial in order for the judiciary to find 
applicable laws when dealing with concrete disputes between parties. 
The following major cases show that the independence of the judiciary 
and individual judges were in danger of being corroded under the Meiji 
government. While judicial power was exercised under the name of the 
Emperor in the Meiji Constitution,73 under the people’s sovereignty 
and Article 76 of the current Constitution, judges were obliged to find 
and apply relevant law in cases with concrete disputes between 
parties.74 In order to do so objectively, the judiciary and individual 
judges must function independently of political pressure. 75  Thus, 
judges should abide by the law and his or her professional duty.76 
  
 
69 Yuichiro Tsuji, Why Does the Japanese Constitution not Include the Creation of a 
Special Tribunal?, 23 SURUGADAI J. L & POL. 170 (2009). 
70 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 235–36; SATO, supra note 27, at 597–98. 
71 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 235–36; SATO, supra note 27, at 597–98. 
72 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 2 (Japan); NONAKA ET 
AL. II, supra note 36, at 235. 
73 DAINIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [Meiji Constitution, Constitution of the 
Empire of Japan], at art. 57 (Japan). 
74 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 228–30; SATO, supra note 27, at 581–90. 
75 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 240–47; SATO, supra note 27, at 575, 581. 
76 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76 (Japan). 
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A. Several Major Cases Regarding the Independence of the 
Judiciary 
There are several major cases that question the validity of the 
independence of the judiciary.77 The first case is the Kojima case.78 Just 
after the restoration period and the Boshin War, the new Meiji 
government began.79 Prince Nicholai from Russia (later known as Tsar 
Nicholas II), was attacked by a Japanese police officer in May 1891.80 
The officer was tried in the district court in Ōtsu and the government 
insisted on capital punishment, although there was no statute permitting 
capital punishment for attacks on foreign royalty (the most relevant 
statute only permitted capital punishment for attacks on Japanese 
royalty). 81  In Tokyo, the President of the Supreme Court, Iken 
(Korekata) Kojima, insisted that capital punishment should not be 
rendered.82 This case shows that the judiciary maintained independence 
from political power. It is questionable whether the President of the 
Supreme Court in Tokyo may encroach upon the independence of the 
district court judge in Ōtsu.83 
The second case is the Fukushima case.84 During the Cold War, the 
government planned to build missile bases in national forests for 
defense against possible Russian attacks.85 Judge Shigeo Fukushima of 
the Sapporo district court rendered a decision stating that the Self 
Defense Forces were prohibited from building the missile base and that 
 
77 Yuichiro Tsuji, Independence of the Judiciary and Judges in Japan, 24 SURUGADAI J. 
L. & POL., 63, 70–75 (2011). 
78 SEIICHIRO KUSUNOKI, KOJIMA KOREKATA: ŌTSU JIKEN TO MEIJI NASHONARIZUMU 
(CHŪKŌ SHINSHO), 24–33 (1997), [hereinafter KOJIMA KOREKATA]; see also Tsuji, supra 
note 77, at 70–72. 
79 KOJIMA KOREKATA, supra note 78; see also Tsuji, supra note 77, at 71. 
80 KOJIMA KOREKATA, supra note 78; see also Tsuji, supra note 77, at 70. 
81 IZUMI TOKUJI, supra note 59, at 3–6; KOJIMA KOREKATA, supra note 78, at 48–64; 
NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 347 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter ASHIBE]. 
82 Id.; NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 241; KOJIMA KOREKATA, supra note 78, at 
48–64; SATO, supra note 27, at 62–63. 
83 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 244; IZUMI TOKUJI, supra note 59, at 4; Tsuji, 
supra note 77, at 71–72. 
84 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, Shōwa 52 (Gyo tsu) no. 56, 36 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1679; see generally NONAKA ET AL. II, supra 
note 36, at 282. 
85 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, Shōwa 52 (Gyo tsu) no. 56, 36 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1679 (Japan). 
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Article 9 contravened its construction.86 Before rendering this decision, 
Fukushima received a private note from the director of the district 
court, Judge Hiraga.87 The memo, which was not an order, advised 
cordially that an unconstitutional decision should be avoided. 88 
Director Judge Hiraga was charged by the impeachment committee, but 
was still promoted after the charge was dismissed.89 Judge Fukushima 
moved to the Tokyo district court, but was transferred to the family 
court for a number of years.90 He belonged to the Young Lawyers 
Association (YLA) (Seinen Houritsuka Kyoukai) that actively worked 
for liberal ideology and was influenced by the Communist Party.91 
The third case is the Miyamoto case.92 Under Article 80, a judge’s 
term lasts for ten years. 93  After ten years, the judge can be 
reappointed. 94  In 1971, Assistant Judge Miyamoto’s reappointment 
was rejected after his ten-year term ended.95 The Supreme Court did 
not include his name on the list of judges provided to the cabinet for 
appointment.96 When Miyamoto asked why, the Supreme Court did not 
offer a reason other than that they have discretion regarding who is put 
on the reappointment list.97 Critics alleged that the reason he was not 
reappointed was because he was a member of the YLA, and argued that 
such a reason for not reappointing him was discrimination, as it 
infringed on the right to ideas and thoughts protected under Article 19 
of the Constitution.98 
 
86 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
87 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 244, 259; SATO, supra note 27, at 617. 
88 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 244, 259; SATO, supra note 27, at 617. 
89 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 244, 259; SATO, supra note 27, at 617. 
90 FUKUSHIMA ET AL., NAGANUMA JIKEN HIRAGA SHOKAN [Naganuma Case, Hiraga 
Letter], 114 (2009), [hereinafter FUKUSHIMA]. 
91 J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 21 (2003) (Ramseyer showed LDP control 
over the General Secretary of the Supreme Court in malapportionment cases.). 
92 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 260. 
93 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan). 
94 Id. 
95 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 260. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Rinji soukai:saibankan no sainin kyohi ni kansuru ketsuki [Resolution for Denial of 
Reappointment of Judges] (1971) (Japan), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document 
/assembly_resolution/year/1971/1971_4.html; RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 91, at 
22–23. 
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The fourth case is the Teranishi case.99 Articles 49 and 52 of the 
Court Act prohibits judges from participating in political activity.100 
Assistant Judge Teranishi was invited to be a panelist on a wiretap 
investigation bill.101 The director of the district court advised Teranishi 
that he should not attend. 102  Teranishi ultimately attended as an 
audience member, not as a panelist on the stage, and the moderator 
asked for questions from the audience.103 Teranishi raised his hand and 
stated that he was told not to attend as a panelist but given that he was 
now an audience member, he was not prohibited from asserting his 
opinion as a citizen in audience.104 Subsequently, he was reprimanded 
in a disciplinary adjudication for disciplinary action (Bungen Shobun) 
under the Judge Status Act by the judiciary.105 The Impeachment Court, 
convened in the Diet, consists of members of both Houses of the Diet 
according to Article 64 of the Constitution. 106  Article 78 of the 
Constitution provides that the disciplinary court is responsible for 
determining whether judges are “mentally or physically incompetent to 
perform official duties.”107 The Supreme Court and the High Court 
have exclusive jurisdiction, but did not hear an appeal for this 
disciplinary action. 108  The Supreme Court noted that judges are 
expected to be politically neutral and independent in order to maintain 
the people’s trust; thus, a judge’s right to freedom of speech is not 
absolute due to the restrictions placed upon it by other principles found 
in the Constitution.109 To balance the interests lost and acquired by this 
judicial restriction, the Court reviewed the necessity of the restriction 
on judicial political participation, the legitimacy of the prohibition’s 
 
99 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 1998, Heisei 10 (Bun ku) no.1, 52 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1761 (Japan). 
100 Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 49, 52 (Japan). 
101 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 1998, Heisei 10 (Bun ku) no.1, 52 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1761 (Japan). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Saibankan bungen hō [Judges Status Act], Law No. 127 of 1947 (Japan). 
106 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 64 (Japan). 
107 See id. art. 78. 
108 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 1998, Heisei 10 (Bun ku) no.1, 52 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1761 (Japan). 
109 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 1998, Heisei 10 (bun ku) no. 1, 52, 9 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1761 (Japan). 
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purpose, and the reasonable relation of the measure used to achieve the 
purpose.110 
The last case is the Urawa case.111 In this case, Mrs. Urawa killed 
her three children and attempted, but failed, to kill herself. 112  Her 
prosecution resulted in a finding of guilt and she was sentenced to three 
years in prison and three years’ suspension. 113  The Committee on 
Judicial Affairs of the House of Councilors criticized this decision as 
being too lenient. The Supreme Court responded that the power to 
investigate under Article 62 may not be exercised to criticize judicial 
decisions because it would have a chilling effect on judicial decision-
making in similar cases in the future.114 The Diet argued that the law-
making power under Article 41 takes precedence over the judiciary and 
the cabinet.115 The judiciary responded that the Diet’s exclusive law-
making power means it is centrally positioned in relation to voters for 
law-making, not that the Diet is legally superior to other branches of 
the government.116 
The Fukushima, Miyamoto, and Teranishi cases show that the power 
of judiciary appointments has been continuously reviewed when the 
fairness of appointments and reappointments of judges are called into 
question. The Fukushima and Miyamoto cases illustrate the strong 
influence that the office of the Supreme Court has over individual 
judges through its power of reappointment and transfer. 
Interpreting Article 80(1) of the Constitution has been controversial. 
One interpretation argues that the power of appointment and that of 
reappointment are identical, such that the reappointment power is 
 
110 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 1998, Heisei 10 (Bun ku) no.1, 52 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1761; SATO, supra note 27, at 619. 
111 Yuichiro Tsuji, Law Making Power in Japan-Legislative Assessment in Japan, 10 (1) 
KLRI (KOREAN LEGISLATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE) 173–204 (2016); Yuichiro Tsuji, 
Legal Issues Presented in a Recent Japanese Book Scanning Case, 64 TSUKUBA J. L. & 
POL. 73 (2015). 
112 Yuichiro Tsuji, Law Making Power in Japan-Legislative Assessment in Japan, 10 (1) 
KLRI (KOREAN LEGISLATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE) 173–204 (2016); Yuichiro Tsuji, 
Legal Issues Presented in a Recent Japanese Book Scanning Case, 64 TSUKUBA J. L. & 
POL. 73 (2015). 
113 Yuichiro Tsuji, Law Making Power in Japan-Legislative Assessment in Japan, 10 (1) 
KLRI (KOREAN LEGISLATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE) 173–204 (2016); Yuichiro Tsuji, 
Legal Issues Presented in a Recent Japanese Book Scanning Case, 64 TSUKUBA J. L. & 
POL. 73 (2015). 
114 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 62 (Japan). 
115 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 145, 243; SATO, supra note 27, at 466. 
116 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 144; SATO, supra note 27, at 429–32. 
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discretionary.117 Another interpretation argues that this discretionary 
power is restricted. 118  Following the ten-year anniversary of the 
Article’s enactment, the status and disqualification of judges were 
examined.119 Essentially, judges are reappointed except under special 
circumstances in which the judge’s qualifications are called into 
question.120 The power of reappointment is objective and mechanical 
for any person with reasonable sensitivities who would reach the same 
conclusion.121 A third interpretation of Article 80(1) distinguishes the 
power of appointment from that of reappointment.122 Overall, except 
for the condition provided in Article 78, Article 80 provides that 
judge’s judicial status is protected even after the first ten years, and 
then, after every subsequent decade, the judge’s qualifications are re-
examined.123 
The Teranishi case demonstrates how strongly regulated judges are 
when it comes to political speech. Similarly, in the Sarufutsu case, a 
postal officer, who was a secretary general of council of the labor 
union, put up 184 posters of a public office candidate on official notice 
boards after work. He was allegedly in violation of the Rules of the 
National Personnel Authority 124  designated by the National Public 
Service Act. 125  The rules of the National Personnel Authority 
prohibited several political actions, including posting posters of 
political office candidates.126 In balancing the interests gained and lost 
by these regulations, the Supreme Court found the postal worker’s act 
to be in violation of the National Public Service Act and fined him 
according to the standard set forth while discussing the purpose of the 
 
117 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 250–52; SATO, supra note 27, at 399–400. 
118 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 250–52. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Jinji in Kisoku [Rules of the National Personnel Authority] under Kokka koumuin hō 
[National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 of 1947 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Nov. 6, 1974, Showa 44 (a) no. 1501, 28, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJINJI HANREISHŪ 
[KeiShū] 393 (Japan) (called the Sarufutsu Case); ASHIBE, supra note 81, at 272. 
125 Kokka koumuin hō [National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 of 1947 (Japan) (This 
case has an issue of carte blanche that the legislature gives too much power to inferior 
regulation.). 
126 Jinji in Kisoku [Rules of the National Personnel Authority] under Kokka koumuin hō 
[National Public Service Act], Law No. 120 of 1947 (Japan). 
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prohibition and the relationship between the purpose and prohibited 
political activities.127 
B. Changes in the Supreme Court in the 1950s and 60s 
The Supreme Court acknowledged many unconstitutional decisions 
made in the 1950s and 60s.128 This was a period of significant social 
movements and global advancements; for example, during this time 
period, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was renewed in 1960, and the 
student movement and labor dispute became radicalized.129 
In 1958, the Nobusuke Kishi government amended the Police Duties 
Execution Act (PDEA) to regulate citizens’ political activities in order 
to protect public security.130 The Act was criticized by newspapers for 
being overbroad as even private dates of young people could fall under 
the PDEA’s restrictions.131 
In the Zentei Tokyo chu yu case of 1966, the Supreme Court stated 
that government officials enjoyed labor rights like those of employees 
of private companies. 132  This 1966 decision overruled the 1953 
decision that broadly supported the regulation of public official labor 
rights.133 In the Zen nou rin keishoku hou case of 1969, the Court 
interpreted statutes to respect labor rights by adopting the Ashwander 
rule out of the U.S. Supreme Court case by the same name.134 The 
Ashwander rule states that when the court thinks unconstitutional 
doubts may arise if the text of a statute is applied to a fact, the court 
 
127 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 6, 1974, Showa 44 (a) no. 1501, 28 (9) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 393 (Japan). 
128 See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and 
the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 124–25 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007); 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] April 25, 1973, Showa 43 (a) no. 2780, 27 (4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 547 (Japan) (This case illustrated that Japanese Supreme Court 
vacated 1965 decision advocating labor right.); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1965, 
Showa 39 (a) no. 296, 20 (8) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 901 (Japan). 
129 Kyosan shugisha doumei [Communist league formed], SHOWA MAINICHI, 
http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1958/12/post-e3f4.html. 
130 Keisatsu kan shokumu sikkou hō [The Police Duties Execution Act], Law No. 136 of 
1948 (No. 94 of 2006) (Japan). 
131 Keishoku hou kaisei an wo kokkai teishutsu [The Amended Bill of PDEA is Submitted 
to the Diet], SHOWA MAINICHI, http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1958/10/post-f359.html. 
132 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1965, Showa 39 (a) no. 296, 20 (8) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 901 (Japan). 
133 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 8, 1953, Showa 24 (re) no. 685, 7(4) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 775 (Japan). 
134 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973, Showa 43(a) no. 2780, 27(4) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 547 (Japan). 
TSUJI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2018  12:36 PM 
2018] Forgotten People: A Judicial Apology for 239 
Leprosy Patients in Japan 
may narrow the prohibited activities.135 In 1973, the Japanese Supreme 
Court denied the 1969 application of the Ashwander rule.136 When the 
PDEA was submitted to the House of the Representatives in 1958, 
some leaders from agriculture and forest labor unions (Zennorin) 
incited labor disputes.137 The union leaders were prosecuted under the 
Japanese National Civil Service Act (Kokka Koumuin Hou), which 
interpreted Japanese National Civil Service Law to respect labor 
rights.138 Following these judiciary changes, judges’ meetings were 
made public and discussions regarding civil, criminal, and juvenile 
cases began.139 
C. Leprosy and the Independence of Judges 
These cases reveal that protecting the independence of judges means 
that judges must be able to exercise their power to uncover what the 
applicable law is, independent of political influences. The Naganuma 
case illustrates that individual judges are under informal pressure from 
district court chiefs. 140  With respect to the isolated sanatorium for 
leprosy, it is doubtful that judicial independence from political pressure 
was similarly questioned. However, under due process of law, the 
fairness of judicial decisions should be examined for party patients.141 
Allowing trials to be open to the public gives the general public an 
opportunity to freely criticize the fairness of the trial and its ultimate 
outcome. The ninety-five cases relating to the national sanatorium 
might include unfair charges under an unfair proceeding. 142  For 
 
135 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). For this analysis, see NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 312; ASHIBE, supra 
note 81, at 370–71. 
136 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973, Showa 43(a) no. 2780, 27(4) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 547. For an analysis of this case, see ASHIBE, supra 
note 81, at 268–71. 
137 Id. 
138 Kokka koumuin hŌ [Japanese National Civil Service Act] Law No. 261 of 1950 (No. 
69 of 2014) (Japan). 
139 SATO, supra note 27, at 603; Kakyu saibansho simei simon iinkai [Advisory 
Committee on Appointment of Inferior Judges at Inferior Courts], SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/index.html (last visited Oct. 30 
2017); Saibankan no jinji hyouka no arikatani kansuru kenkyukai [Research on Personal 
Evaluation System for Judges], SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO, http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/iinkai 
/saiban_kenkyu/hokokusho2/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
140 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 244; SATO, supra note 27, at 617. 
141 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 31 (Japan). 
142 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1 at 4, 8. 
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example, in a murder case, a leper was prosecuted, found guilty, and 
sentenced to death, even though the defendant was not given an open 
trial.143 Accordingly, the defendant argued that this prosecution and 
trial was tainted by bias and prejudice.144 
While admiring the Secretary General of the office of the Supreme 
Court for its apology, we should ardently insist that the judiciary 
conduct retrials for the deceased if they, or their families, desire 
compensation for or restoration of their reputations. Though the result 
may not have legal implications, the moral impact would be significant. 
III 
AUTONOMY OF THE JUDICIARY 
A. The Office of the Supreme Court 
The office of the Supreme Court is vital for the independence of the 
judiciary. Article 77 provides the Supreme Court with rule-making 
powers to control procedures relating to legal practice and matters 
relating to attorneys, as well as to regulate the internal discipline of the 
courts and administration of judicial affairs.145 However, the Diet has 
exclusive law-making power to enact rules of procedure and practice, 
rules relating to attorneys, and rules for internal discipline of the courts 
and administration of judicial affairs.146 Some argue that internal affairs 
and judicial administration is exclusive to the judiciary. 147  As is 
expected, these judicial and statutory authorities may, at times, face 
competing interests and outcomes.148 
The office of the Supreme Court is tasked with designing the judicial 
organization, revising statutes, managing human resources, 
maintaining facilities, accounting and acquiring the budget for the 
judiciary, and supporting the members of the Supreme Court Justice’s 
 
143 Id. at 1–8. (Expert Committee Opinion); see also THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR, 
AND WELFARE, The Truth of Fujimoto Case, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/ken 
kou/hansen/kanren/dl/4a16.pdf. In this case, someone threw dynamite into the house of an 
official at the Senatorial Department and the official was injured. Mr. Fujimoto was arrested 
and found guilty of the crime. At that time, he was suspected to be a leper. Just after this 
decision, Mr. Fujimoto ran out of the sanatorium. Three weeks later, the injured official was 
killed. Mr. Fujimoto was sentenced to death and the criminal procedure was conducted in 
sanatorium. His family brought action for retrial. Id. 
144 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, 8. 
145 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 77 (Japan). 
146 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 77, para. 1 (Japan); NONAKA ET 
AL. II, supra note 36, at 252–53; SATO, supra note 27, at 611–13. 
147 SATO, supra note 27, at 611–13. 
148 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 252. 
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conference.149 Reflecting the Meiji constitutional experience, judicial 
power is concentrated in the office and the Justice Conference.150 The 
Naganuma and Kojima cases demonstrate the influence that the office 
of the Supreme Court has on the independence of judges.151 
The Japanese judiciary adopted a career system and law school 
system similar to the United States in 2004 when Japanese universities 
established three-year juris doctor programs. 152  The applicants are 
required to pass a bar examination and spend one year at a judicial 
training institute.153 Only the students with the highest grades become 
prosecutors or judges.154 
Judges usually transfer to various districts every three years and 
David Law, a professor at Washington University in St. Louis, thinks 
that the current docket is excessively large.155  In 2015, there were 
around 3,000 judges in Japan. In a mere ten years, the number of 
lawyers increased from 21,000 to 36,000; however, the number of 
judges and prosecutors has not increased significantly since 1999.156 
David Law believes that judges who quickly resolve cases have an 
increased likelihood of being transferred to large, major cities.157 
Some argue that the office of the Supreme Court gives promotional 
and transfer priority to judges who resolve the greatest number of cases 
and find in favor of previous Supreme Court holdings.158 If a judge 
renders decisions that oppose Supreme Court decisions, such as in 
Naganuma, he or she is transferred to a smaller city and family court, 
 
149 Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12 (Japan). 
150 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 228, 235–36; SATO, supra note 27, at 625. 
151 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 244; SATO, supra note 27, at 617. 
152 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 269–70. 
153 Id.; SATO, supra note 27, at 578–79. 
154 Saibankan no jouken [Requirement to be Judge], ASAHI SHIMBUN (Apr. 18, 1994); 
Shimbun to 9 jou [Newspaper and article 9], ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 16, 2016). 
155 David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1425, 1426, 1461 (2011). 
156 Saibankan Su, Kensatsukan Su, Bengosi Su No Suii [Number of Judges, Prosecutor 
Number, Lawyer Number] [LAWYERS WHITE PAPERS], http://www.nichibenren.or.jp 
/library/ja/jfba_info/statistics/data/white_paper/2015/1-3-4_hososansha_suii_2015.pdf 
(last visited May 29, 2017). The number of the lawyers is around 36,000, prosecutors is 
1,900, and judges is 2,944. Id. 
157 David Law, Lessons of Experience in the Enterprise of Constitutional Design: The 
Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1562 
(2009). 
158 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 257. 
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not to larger cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka.159 
According to Miyazawa’s analysis, a professor at University of 
California Hastings and an expert on law and society study, prospective 
judges are usually sent to the Ministry of Justice for a certain period for 
personnel exchange and, while there, represent the government in 
litigation brought under the State Redress Act for events such as floods 
and earthquakes.160 Upon their return to the judiciary, these judges 
make use of their experiences within the Ministry of Justice in litigation 
against the government.161 Miyazawa indicates that after working for 
the Ministry of Justice, judges return to the judiciary with pro-
government attitudes and decide case accordingly.162 The judge then 
loses his or her ability to act as a neutral arbitrator between opposing 
parties and instead views the case from the perspective of a defender of 
the government.163 
Ex-Justice Shigeo Takii164 believes that because justices lack the 
experience and resources for judicial administration, they are hesitant 
to speak up at judicial conferences unless specifically asked to do so.165 
The office of the Supreme Court takes the lead in judicial 
administration because the president of the Supreme Court is too busy 
to attend minor court conferences.166 
B. Judicial Review and Nomination of Judges 
Japanese students may wrongly believe that the Japanese judiciary 
follows all the procedures of the U.S. judiciary. It is true that the 
General Headquarter and Japanese government jointly drafted the 
current Constitution after adopting the Potsdam Declaration. The 
Japanese judiciary did not, however, replicate the U.S. judiciary. 
Similarly to the United States, Japanese judicial review entails a 
concrete, not abstract, judicial review.167 However, compared to the 
 
159 RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 91, at 126–27; Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 
265. 
160 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 263. 
161 Id. at 269. 
162 Id. at 270. 
163 Id. 
164 Shigeo Takii, Saikou Saibansho Wa Kawattaka [Has the Supreme Court changed?] 
19 (Iwanami Shoten, 2009). 
165 Id. at 38. 
166 Tokiyasu Fujita, SAIKOUSAI KAIKO ROKU [The Memoirs of the Supreme Court] 215–
20 (Yuhikaku, 2012); Takii, supra note 164, at 37. 
167 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 274–77; KOJI SATO, supra note 27, at 581, 625; 
Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, Showa 30(o) no. 96, 14(7) SAIKO SAIBANSHO 
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United States, far fewer decisions are deemed unconstitutional in 
Japan.168 One reason for this may be the different ways in which the 
countries appoint their judges and organize their judicial career system. 
The Japanese judiciary attempted to reform its configuration of judicial 
review just after WWII.169 
Professor, and former justice, Masami Ito170 stated that Japan prefers 
faceless judges because they are more likely to render uniform 
decisions without presenting novel arguments, as it is futile to ask 
career-oriented judges to exercise judicial review diligently.171 
Currently, the president of the Supreme Court is nominated by the 
Emperor under Article 6(2) of the Constitution.172  In addition, the 
number of Supreme Court justices is fixed at fifteen by the Court Act.173 
This number was chosen during the drafting of the Constitution to keep 
the number of Supreme Court justices equal to the number of cabinet 
ministers.174 Only fifteen justices of the Supreme Court are reviewed 
under the Law of the People’s Examination of the Supreme Court 
Judges175 and Article 78 of the Constitution. The selection process is 
called Kokumin Shinsa, a recall system which followed the state of 
Missouri in that judges are fired if the approval vote for firing the judge 
is superior to that of disapproval of firing.176 Japanese people are also 
given an opportunity to evaluate the judges of the Supreme Court. It 
has been criticized for its ineffectiveness because members of the 
general public do not even know the justices’ names. 
 
MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1206; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 
76 & 81 (Japan). 
168 Law, supra note 156, at 1437. 
169 Eiji Sasada, Shihou katei to minshu shugi [Judicial Process and Democracy], 63 PUB. 
L. RES. 110 (2001); IZUMI, supra note 59, at 57–88. 
170 Masami Ito, Saibankan To Gakusha No Aida [Between Justice and Scholar], 106–37 
(Yuhikaku, 1993). 
171 Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 66 TSUKUBA J. L. & POL’Y, 65 
(2016). 
172 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 31 (Japan). 
173 Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 5, 9, & 10 (Japan). 
174 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 8, 1960, Showa 30(o) no. 96, 14(7) SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1206 (Japan). 
175 Kokumin Shinsa hō [Law of the People’s Examination of the Supreme Court Judges], 
Law No. 94 of 2016 (Japan). 
176 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 78 (Japan); ASHIBE, supra note 
81, at 340. 
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Supreme Court justices retire at seventy years old,177 while inferior 
court judges retire at sixty-five.178 Ten justices are selected from the 
criminal and civil judiciary, and five are selected from a variety of 
fields and divisions, such as the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, university 
professors, diplomats, or lawyers. 179  The Supreme Court begins 
searching for candidates before justices reach retiring age and prepares 
a list. Ex-Justice Tokiyasu Fujita, who was a professor at Tohoku 
University, later wrote that candidates for justices are limited to ages 
sixty to sixty five years old as a custom. 180  The Court adds one 
additional name to the list of candidates over the number of prospective 
positions available in the Court.181 This is referred to as the “plus one 
rule.”182 The cabinet nominates justices from the list of candidates.183 
To be eligible for a position as a justice the candidate must be over forty 
years old and have more than ten years of experience.184 Ex-Justice 
Fujita claims that political influence from leading parties does not 
exist.185 Former Justice Shigeo Takii, who was selected from the bar 
association, thinks that justice appointment transparency can be 
achieved when no significant changes occur within the political parties 
in Parliament.186 He argues that new appointments influence shifts in 
constitutional decisions.187 Former Justice Tokuji Izumi agrees with 
Takii that when the Secretary General of the cabinet, Kanbo choukan, 
simply offered a report describing a nominee’s brief career during a 
press conference, it did not achieve transparency in judicial 
appointments because the report was too small an opportunity for the 
Japanese people to learn who their judges are, and the report should 
note more information such as how the judge has rendered decisions 
during his or her career.188 
  
 
177 Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12 (Japan). 
178 See id. 
179 Takii, supra note 164, at 4, 7–10. 
180 Tokiyasu Fujita, SAIKOUSAI KAIKO ROKU [The Memoirs of the Supreme Court] 16 
(Yuhikaku, 2012). 
181 Id. at 13–14; Takii, supra note 164, at 3–6. 
182 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 249–50, 258. 
183 Id. 
184 Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 41 (Japan). 
185 Fujita, supra note 166, at 163–73. 
186 Takii, supra note 164, at 6. 
187 Id. at 54. 
188 IZUMI, supra note 59, at 130. 
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C. Judicial Reform in 1999 and Advisory Council for Appointment 
in Japan 
The judicial promotion and transfer system has been criticized by 
constitutional scholars.189 The Justice System Reforms Council (JSRC) 
instituted judicial reform in 1999 which promoted transparency by 
reforming aspects of judicial appointment and evaluations of judges.190 
The judicial reform suggested that the voices of citizens should be more 
clearly reflected by judges’ perspective within the judiciary.191 The 
Supreme Court established the Judge Appointment Advisory Council 
(Advisory Council), Saibankan shimei simon Iinkai.192 The Advisory 
Council is comprised of eleven people—five are lawyers, prosecutors, 
or judges, and six are academic professors.193 The Advisory Council 
reviews the eligibility of judges for appointment, interviews 
candidates, and sends a report to the Secretary General of the office of 
the Supreme Court.194 In addition, there is a regional council with five 
to nine members that supports the national Advisory Council. 195 
Between 1962 and 1964, Japan’s Bar Association attempted, but failed 
to establish this Advisory Council. It was not until the judicial reform 
of 1999 that such progress was made in the judiciary.196 
The Constitution does not set a term limit for the position of prime 
minister. 197  Currently, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is attempting to 
become the head of his ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP).198 Under the parliamentary system, the head of the ruling party 
is the prime minister in the cabinet.199 The prime minister is appointed 
 
189 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 258; Takii, supra note 164, at 68-82. 
190 SATO, supra note 27, at 575, 581. 
191 Id. at 577. 
192 Id. at 603. 
193 Id. at 603–05. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 604. 
197 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 45 (Japan). Under the 
parliamentary system, the prime minister is chosen from the members of the Diet. Usually 
the Japanese prime minister is selected from the lower house (House of Representatives). 
The constitution provides a two-year term for members of the lower house in the Diet. Id. 
198 Justin McCurry, Shinzo Abe secures strong mandate in Japan’s general election, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/shinzo-abe-
secures-strong-mandate-in-japans-general-election. 
199 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ][CONSTITUTION], art. 67 (Japan). 
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from either of the two Houses of the Diet.200 Generally, the prime 
minister has been selected from the House of Representatives, whose 
members’ terms last four years.201 Under LDP regulation, the term for 
the head of the party is three years.202 
As previously stated, Supreme Court justices are appointed when 
they are close to retiring age; thus, many of them only serve for a few 
years. If Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet maintains power until 2019, he 
may have appointed every one of the fifteen justices on the Supreme 
Court. 203  This possibility may lead some to question the Supreme 
Court’s judicial independence. Meanwhile, the cabinet makes 
appointments based on the list prepared by the judiciary. Although it is 
possible that this was an appropriate exercise of appointment power, 
others think that the cabinet has the power to make appointments 
beyond the list made by the Supreme Court.204 
The Conservative Party argues for a constitutional amendment to 
establish a constitutional law court.205 
D. Judicial Independence for the Leprosy Case 
Miyazawa questioned whether the institutional independence of the 
judiciary guarantees the independence of individual judges. 206  He 
criticized the amount of power that the Secretary General wields in the 
office of the Supreme Court. 207  He argued that in the Miyamoto 
reappointment case, the reason Miyamoto’s reappointment was denied 
was clearly political.208 Miyazawa believes that when judges are sent 
to the Ministry of Justice, their practices and experiences strongly 
influence administrative law litigation when the government is sued for 
damage under the Redress Act for acts such as the breakdown of a river 
bank.209 
 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at art. 45. 
202 This is the code of the Liberal Democratic Party. See Article 80 of LDP 
https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/aboutus/organization.pdf; see also Chapter XVI of 
Officers-Article 80, Liberal Democratic Party, http://www.marino.ne.jp/~rendaico/jissen 
/kiyakuco/tatohanokiyakuco/jimintonokiyakuco.htm. 
203 Fujita, supra note 166, at 15. 
204 NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 36, at 258. 
205 Ishin no kai (Ishin party of Japan), Constitutional Draft, https://o-ishin.jp/news 
/2017/images/90da581ba24723f77027257436ab13c1cec1a1ed.pdf. 
206 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 263. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
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Ex-Justice Takii210 questioned Miyazawa’s theory in regard to a 
recent amendment to the Administrative Litigation Act. 211  First, a 
provision was added to permit mandamus actions to seek orders that 
obligate an administrative agency to issue an original administrative 
disposition. Second, the court may issue a provisional injunctive order 
to an administrative agency. 
Miyazawa supports his argument regarding the office of the 
Secretary General’s power to relocate inferior court judges to local or 
family court by using data from river flood cases. 212  As Law and 
Kamiya point out, Supreme Court justices can’t render decisions 
without support by research judges.213 These research judges collect 
materials and make recommendations to justices. 214  Both Law and 
Miyazawa indicate that the office of the Supreme Court is influential. 
Ex-Justice Fujita objects to both Law’s and Miyazawa’s arguments—
arguing that the Supreme Court encourages young judges not to be 
discouraged by the office of the Supreme Court.215 Fujita noted that one 
proposal to establish a study group for interpreting a new 
administrative litigation act was discussed, but was stalled over 
concerns that the Supreme Court may enforce a certain interpretation, 
and young judges might be hesitant to speak out.216 
On the other hand, Fujita still might agree with Miyazawa that there 
are two career paths for judges: one is for judges to transfer to large 
cities and be promoted, and the other is for judges to be relocated to 
family courts.217 
Using data collected from 276 judges, J. Mark Ramseyer, a professor 
of Japanese Legal Studies at Harvard Law School,218 illustrated that the 
 
210 Takii, supra note 164, at 93, 334. 
211 See Gyousei Jiken Soshou hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 
1962, art.3 (Japan). 
212 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 280. 
213 Law, supra note 155, at 1464; see also Masako Kamiya, Decision Making on the 
Japanese Supreme Court, Chōsakan, Research Judges Toiling at the Stone Fortress, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011). 
214 Takii, supra note 164, at 31–36; IZUMI, supra note 59, at 136. 
215 Law, supra note 155, at 1460–61; Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 275; Fujita, supra note 
166, at 164. 
216 Fujita, supra note 166, at 167. 
217 Id. at 168. Fujita thinks that promotion depends partly on personality, such as 
leadership and cooperativeness. Id. 
218 RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 91, at 37–43; FUKUSHIMA, supra note 90, at 
126–27. 
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office of the Supreme Court has significant influence over judicial 
career paths. He also showed data that being a member of the YLA had 
a negative impact on potential transfers. Ramseyer argued that the 
Japanese judiciary essentially works as an agent of the government’s 
ruling party, the LDP.219 According to Ramseyer, by controlling job 
assignments, the “LDP influenced judges, indirectly to be sure, by 
promoting some and by not promoting others.” 220  Percy Luney, a 
former professor from North Carolina Central University, agrees.221 
John Haley at Washington University St. Louis disagrees with 
Miyazawa and Ramseyer, arguing that the Japanese judiciary is 
independent.222 Haley stresses that the judiciary is autonomous and 
feels no political pressure from LDP intervention. 223  Haley also 
believes that the internal discipline and control exercised in the 
Miyamoto case was successful.224  Moreover, Haley asserts that the 
uniformity and continuity of judicial decisions should fix responsible 
judicial behavior.225 
Miyazawa counters Haley’s argument, agreeing with his factual 
analysis, but focusing on the lack of active movement of judges in the 
judiciary for the past twenty years regarding the 1966 decision, except 
in the case of an assistant judge who was reprimanded for his open 
objection to a law legalizing wiretapping, until judicial reform was 
implemented. 226  Miyazawa reasons that most applicants for 
appointment are now conformists, who accept the practices established 
in the 1970s and 1980s as a given for government bureaucracy.227 
Law looked at interviews conducted with the younger generation in 
Japan and concluded that two-thirds of those interviewed are likely to 
be conservative, and a heavy case load may tempt justices to simply 
 
219 RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 91, at 80–81, 126–27. 
220 Id. at 127. 
221 See Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the 
Parliamentary System, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123, 144 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. 
& Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
222 John Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, The Japanese Judiciary: 
Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING 
POINT 99, 102–12 (Daniel Foote ed., 2007) (describing generally how appointment to and 
progression through the judiciary occurs). 
223 Id. at 121, 123. 
224 Id. at 122. 
225 Id. 
226 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 277–80. 
227 Id. at 127. 
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follow the majority rule.228 Research judges often attempt to work for 
the entire court rather than for an individual justice. Thus, if a justice 
wants to oppose the majority, he or she must collect and prepare 
evidence and materials to draft his opinion because research judges do 
not assist justices in writing dissenting opinions. 
Ex-Justice Fujita would criticize Luney’s, Haley’s, and Law’s 
arguments that the Supreme Court wants to maintain a political 
ideology identical to that of the LDP. Fujita argues that their analysis 
was outdated given that it was rooted in circumstances that occurred 
nearly three decades earlier.229 Fujita admits that in the 1950s and 
1960s, the Supreme Court vacated precedents for political reasons, but 
emphasizes that this rarely occurs in the Japanese judiciary today. 
Ex-Justice Koji Miyakawa also disagrees with Law.230 Miyakawa 
thinks that the caseload is not as excessively large as Law suggests.231 
Miyakawa argues that research judges are useless if justices are capable 
of writing their own opinions.232 Izumi, who worked as a research 
judge for three and a half years, explained that there was so much work 
to be done that research judges were allocated by case, not to individual 
justices. Thus, research judges are more likely to focus on shaping 
opinions among justices under a limited time schedule, as the heavy 
caseload prevents justices from writing individual opinions.233 
These analyses are helpful in our review of the judicial apology for 
the leprosy tribunal, although these former justices and scholars have 
yet to mention the issue in relatively novel cases. The apology from the 
office of the Supreme Court is related to the independence of judges 
and the judiciary as a whole. 
As Miyazawa laments, judges are seriously concerned about 
rendering decisions that might displease the Secretary General. Judges 
know that the Secretary General has a significant influence on judge 
 
228 David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2009). 
229 Fujita, supra note 166, at 166–68 (Fujita is afraid of opening research on revised 
Administrative Case Litigation Act because the office of the Supreme Court may impose its 
interpretation on young judges.). 
230 Koji Miyakawa (Mark A. Levin & Megumi Honami Lachapelle trans.), Inside the 
Supreme Court of Japan−From the Perspective of a Former Justice, 15 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. 
& POL’Y J. 196, 196–212 (2014). 
231 Id. at 205. 
232 Id. at 207–08. 
233 IZUMI, supra note 59, at 136–38 (Izumi argues research judges should be allocated to 
individual Justices.). 
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transfers and promotions. 234  The personnel exchange between the 
Ministry of Justice and the judiciary results in judges that are often sent 
to the Ministry of Justice to defend the government in suits for damages 
under the Redress Act.235 This practice encouraged judges to rule in 
favor of the government.236 
Even though the administrative litigation was amended to allow 
several claims for provisional mandamus and injunction, these 
amendments will still be interpreted by the judiciary. Under 
Miyazawa’s analysis, the apology is official and inferior courts should 
not have to worry about the Secretary General at the office of the 
Supreme Court, and may accept the suits against the government 
brought by the leprosy patients’ families. 
As Izumi argues, the judiciary must protect individual human rights 
even when it collides with social welfare, and in order to do so, the 
judicial review must represent the minority whose voices were not 
heard by Parliament. 237  Izumi was a career judge who served as 
Secretary General from 1996 to 2000.238 Thus, I think he believes the 
Secretary General’s apology in 2016 was highly admirable. To 
maintain its leadership––or as Haley describes, to maintain a united 
judiciary––the Supreme Court stopped short of alleging that the past 
action of the Supreme Court was legally wrong. The Secretary General 
could have determined that the judiciary had unconstitutionally 
conducted trials under several doctrines of the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, what leprosy patients may be eager to hear is the moral, 
rather than the legal, apology. 
Ramseyer’s argument focuses on instances in which the Secretary 
General rewarded talented judges who rendered decisions precisely.239 
Ramseyer may argue that the prestige of being a top official in the 
Supreme Court might have prevented a legal apology, and might also 
have actively encouraged individual judges in inferior courts in the 
leprosy case to accept legal responsibility.240 
Similar to the Judge Appointment Council, the Supreme Court 
established an expert council for leprosy. Just as the Judge 
 
234 Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 271. 
235 Id. at 269. 
236 Id. 
237 IZUMI, supra note 59, at 143–44, 254–70. 
238 Id. at imprint. 
239 RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 91, at 95. 
240 Id. at 21–22 (Ramseyer shows influence of the General Secretary of the Supreme 
Court on inferior judges.). 
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Appointment Council sends a report to the Secretary General, the 
leprosy council advised the Supreme Court that the establishment of a 
special tribunal was unconstitutional. As Miyazawa’s and Ramseyer’s 
analyses of the autonomous power of the office of the Supreme Court 
demonstrate, the meaning of the Secretary General’s apology strongly 
influences inferior court judges.241 
Miyakawa examined the function and perspectives of research 
judges for justices.242 Takii wrote that justices listen to research judges’ 
perspectives.243 Law might argue that with regard to the leprosy case, 
an official apology from the judiciary for the past treatment of leprosy 
patients could be a step forward in recognizing legal liability because 
the organized hierarchy of the Japanese judiciary would shape policy 
more effectively than a conflict-based solution judiciary as seen in the 
United States. Law might also expect that judicial review would be 
altered by the leprosy case.244 Miyazawa may praise the leprosy report 
and evaluate it as evidence of the judicial reform that took place in the 
1990s that imputed citizens’ voices to elitisms for being top officials of 
the office of the Supreme Court, and Takii describes three 
unconstitutional decisions that have been rendered post-reform. 245 
Thus, the leprosy report might be one step forward in a positive 
evaluation of the judiciary itself. Although it is a pure supposition, 
Miyakawa may question Law by pointing out that judicial activism 
does not always have a positive outcome and may not have one in the 
leprosy case.246 
Today, in some cases, career justices actively write their dissenting 
opinions themselves. Those justices who have experience from time in 
the office of the Supreme Court as the Secretary General do not need 
research judges to write concurring or dissenting opinions. For 
example, several conspicuous opinions were written by career Justice 
Tokuji Izumi. He wrote a dissenting opinion in a 2007 decision 
regarding political campaign activity in the 2005 and 2015 House of 
 
241 Id. at 95; Miyazawa, supra note 54, at 268. 
242 Miyakawa, supra note 230, at 211. 
243 Takii, supra note 164, at 35. 
244 Law, supra note 155, at 1463–64. 
245 Takii, supra note 164, at 68–82; Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in 
Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 2 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 89, 90–97 (2001). 
246 Miyakawa, supra note 230, at 198, 199–200. 
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Representatives elections and the Political Official Election Act.247 His 
dissenting opinion reflected the constitutional law theory that 
emphasizes the judiciary’s role as the constitutional guarantee.248 His 
opinion tried to limit legislative discretion and protect minorities whose 
voices are not represented in the political process.249 
E. A Comparison of Korematsu and the 2017 UN Resolution for the 
Treatment of Those Affected by Leprosy 
Generally, an apology issued by Japan’s judiciary is not easily 
comparable with that of other countries. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu is helpful for reviewing the 
special tribunal for leprosy patients in Japan.250 
In the Korematsu case, a Japanese American, Fred Korematsu, was 
detained in an internment camp during WWII under Executive Order 
9066.251 The U.S. Supreme Court supported the internment of Japanese 
Americans in the camps and rejected Korematsu’s argument against 
internment.252 The Korematsu case shares several similarities with the 
leprosy case in Japan. 
One similarity relates to how the people discriminated against in 
both cases were treated. In Japan, leprosy patients were, by law, forced 
to live in an isolated sanatorium. Even after the leprosy law was 
abolished, many of the leprosy patients decided to remain in the 
sanatorium because their parents or other family members—who may 
have been able to care for them—had passed away.253 Now, just as the 
number of witnesses to the Japanese internment camps during WWII 
have dwindled, so too have the number of inhabitants who used to be 
residents of the Japanese leprosy sanatorium. One of the legitimate 
applications of judicial review is to exercise such review on behalf of 
marginalized minority people. Professor John Hary Ely discussed this 
 
247 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 2007, Heisei 18 (gyo tsu) No.176, 61(4) Saiko 
Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 1617 (Japan) (Tokuji Izumi, J., dissenting); IZUMI, 
supra note 61, at 219–26. 
248 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 2007, Heisei 18 (gyo tsu) No.176, 61(4) Saiko 
Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 1617 (Japan) (Tokuji Izumi, J., dissenting). 
249 Id. 
250 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
251 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). 
252 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. 
253 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748 Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
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particular application of judicial review254  in the 1980s and it was 
imported into Japanese constitutional studies in the 1990s.255 
In Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Korematsu, he stated that 
the law was unconstitutional because Korematsu was interned based 
solely on his ancestry, without considering evidence or inquiring into 
his loyalty and good disposition toward the United States. Essentially, 
Justice Roberts argued that the law violated the requirement of equal 
treatment under the law.256 Unlike the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Roberts, the Supreme Court of Japan’s report from the special tribunal 
on the leprosy sanatorium law did not conclude that the law violated 
equal protection under the Constitution.257 
Another similarity can be observed in the policies that supported the 
isolation of the leprosy patients and the internment of Japanese 
Americans. The United States established the Japanese American 
internment camps during WWII. The U.S. Supreme Court supported 
the congressional decision to incarcerate Japanese Americans on the 
ground of uncertainty following the Pearl Harbor attack. Similarly, in 
Japan, the leprosy isolation policy and special tribunal for leprosy 
patients was maintained pre- and post-war. 258  Thus, this isolation 
policy remained intact, even after Japan rid itself of the Emperor’s 
direct rule and established its post-war Constitution and judiciary under 
the people’s sovereignty in 1947. 259  Although research in 1960 
revealed that infectivity of leprosy was weak, the Japanese judiciary 
still approved ninety-five special tribunal applications.260 It is clear 
from both the Korematsu and leprosy cases that bias and prejudice 
easily overcome weak evidence for supporting the restriction of human 
rights. 
 
254 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (Harvard Univ. Press, 1981). 
255 KOJI SATO & SHINGENORI MATSUI, MINSHUSHUGI TO SIHOUSHINSA, [Democracy 
and Judicial Review] (Seibundou, 1999). 
256 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Kumamoto 
Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 764, 1748, Hanrei 
Jihou 30 (Japan); HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, app. (special advisory committee opinion), 
at 1–10. 
257 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1; Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] 
May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
258 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 7–41; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218, 221–24. 
259 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 35–39. 
260 Id.; Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) 
no. 764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
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The Kumamoto district court decision encouraged the Diet to pass a 
statute compensating the leprosy patients. 261  Unlike the Korematsu 
decision, the Kumamoto district court decision was that of an inferior 
court, to which the cabinet denied an appeal. Thus, because the cabinet 
denied the appeal, the Japanese Supreme Court could not hear the 
case. 262  Both Japanese and U.S. courts employ concrete judicial 
review, such that they only interpret and announce what the law on a 
matter is between competing parties. Japan finally issued legislative 
remedies for its leprosy isolation policies in 1996 and 2001. In 1996, 
the Japanese Parliament abolished leprosy isolation statutes and, in 
2001, the legislature released a public apology for its inaction. 263 
Similarly, in 1980, the U.S. Congress ordered an investigation of 
Executive Order 9066. This investigation, conducted by the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 
concluded in 1983 that the internment of Japanese Americans was not 
justified by military necessity.264  The Commission recommended a 
legislative remedy and, accordingly, Congress passed the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988.265 President Ronald Reagan signed the law that 
would provide compensation to survivors.266 
These legislative actions demonstrate that the law-making power 
belongs to the Diet in Japan and Congress in the United States based 
on those countries’ respective constitutions. However, with regard to 
law-making in the United States, the President must sign a bill to make 
it effective, while this is not the case with respect to the Prime Minister 
in Japan. However, in both countries, legislative work takes time, and, 
when engaging in judicial review, courts permit wide discretion as to 
when and how a statute is passed. 
Since 2008, the Japanese government has submitted several 
proposed resolutions to the United Nation’s Human Rights Council.267 
 
261 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 35–39. 
262 Kumamoto Chiho Saibansho [Kumamoto Dist. Ct.] May 11, 2001, Heisei 10 (wa) no. 
764, 1748, Hanrei Jihou 30 (Japan). 
263 HANSEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 35–39; Hansen byou ryouyoujo, supra note 26. 
264 Hansen byou ryouyoujo tou ni taisuru hoshoukin no sikyuni kansuru houritsu [Act on 
Payment of Compensation for Hansen’s Disease Recreation Area Residents,], Law No. 63 
of 2001 (Japan). 
265 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988). 
266 Id. (codified at 50 U.S.C § 1989(b) (2012)). 
267 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, Japanese Initiative in the Efforts to 
Eliminate Discrimination against Persons Affected by Leprosy and Their Family Members, 
(July 26, 2017) http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr_ha/page22e_000675.html; see also Human 
Rights Council, Res. 8/13. Elimination of discrimination against persons affected by leprosy 
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In 2015, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 29/5 
(A/HRC/RES/29/5). 268  Under this resolution, member states are 
required to respect the principles and guidelines for the elimination of 
discrimination against leprosy-affected persons and their family 
members. 269  These principles and guidelines were drafted by the 
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee and provide that certain 
human rights, such as the rights to employment, education, and 
healthcare, are to be promoted. Though the resolution has no legally 
binding power, member states should interpret it in a manner consistent 
with its obligation under international human rights law.270 
In June 2017, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 35/9, a 
resolution for the “[e]limination of discrimination against persons 
affected by leprosy and their family members.” 271  The resolution 
declares “that persons affected by leprosy and their family members, 
including women and children, should be treated with dignity and are 
entitled to the enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
under customary international law, relevant conventions, and national 
constitutions and laws.”272 
This resolution might be a pressure from international society to 
demand a review of the special tribunal for leprosy patients in Japan. 
Thanks to the office of the Supreme Court’s 2016 apology, the 
Supreme Court could keep its authority and the prestige of being a top 
section in the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
When the current Japanese Constitution was established in 1947, the 
most important mission of the judiciary was to separate judicial power 
from the executive branch. The leprosy case gives rise to the question 
of whether or not judges can remain independent within the judiciary 
and not be subject to the pressures of the executive branch. 
The leprosy tribunal created serious issues within the Japanese 
judiciary. The Supreme Court officially announced a judicial apology 
 
and their family members, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078245.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 
2017). 
268 Human Rights Council Res. 29/5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29//L.10 (June 30, 2015). 
269 Japanese Initiative in the Efforts to Eliminate Discrimination against Persons 
Affected by Leprosy and Their Family Members, supra note 267. 
270 Id. 
271 Human Rights Council Res. 35/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/L.14 (June 19, 2017). 
272 Id. 
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from the office of the judiciary by a report in 2015. It did not address 
legal responsibility or a complete remedy for affected families. 
Although the current Constitution was influenced by the U.S. 
Constitution, it is not identical. The current Constitution provides that 
the organization of the judiciary stands for the independence of the 
judiciary and its judges. The promotion and transfer systems for judges 
are established, but it is unclear if they play a part in guaranteeing the 
independence of the judiciary and its judges. These differences 
between the U.S. and Japanese constitutions may engender different 
attitudes when exercising concrete judicial review. In Japan, career 
judges are faceless and have a set retiring age. In fact, justices hold their 
positions for such a short time that the Japanese people generally do 
not remember their names; accordingly, the Law of the People’s 
Examination of the Supreme Court Judges under Article 70 is criticized 
for its ineffectiveness. 
Judges are classified into several ranks, and their salaries are 
similarly classified such that there exists a wide gap between higher 
and lower ranks. Judges are transferred every two or three years, which 
may lead judges to follow implied orders from the office of the 
Supreme Court in order to benefit from better transfers or promotions. 
The cabinet appoints judges to the judiciary, but a list of candidates is 
prepared by the Supreme Court and submitted to the cabinet. Usually, 
the cabinet follows the list submitted by the Supreme Court. 
Some critics allege that judicial review in the Japanese Supreme 
Court does not work in the same manner as in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In addition, the research judges assigned to support the Supreme Court 
Justices are not allocated to specific Justices; instead they are allocated 
by case. When writing dissenting opinions, Supreme Court Justices 
need to write their own opinions without the help of research judges. 
Justice may tend to write to make the scope of their decision narrow, 
for fear that their authority unnecessarily falls. 
Today, career justices on the Supreme Court tend to write individual 
opinions that might influence the office of the Supreme Court because 
the Secretary General position is a path toward Supreme Court justice 
positions. The office of the Supreme Court supports Justices and its 
administrative power over personnel affairs is strong. The judiciary 
reform in 1999 established a committee for the appointment of judges, 
and hence, this guaranteed some transparency. 
The constitutional analysis for leprosy treatment by the Japanese 
government has not been widely discussed or acknowledged outside 
Japan. As these patients grow older and pass away, they are forgotten 
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by society. By shedding light on this unequal treatment, we can bring 
some solace to those affected and simultaneously fulfill the 
constitutional law scholar’s duty to explain the organization and 
autonomy of the judiciary to the Japanese public and the rest of the 
world. 
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